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LEGAL ADVICE ABOUT ACTS ALREADY COMMITTED
ABSTRACT
Much legal advice is provided after individuals have committed acts --
whenthey come before a tribunal--ratherthan at the time they decide how to
act.This paper considers the effects and social desirability of such legal
advice.It is emphasized that 1egl advice tends to reduce expected
sanctions, which may encourage acts subject to sanctions.There is, however,
no a priort basis for believing that this is socially undesirable,because,
among other reasons, it may be possible to raise the level of sanctions to
offset their dilution due to legal advice.In addition, legal advice has no
general tendency to improve the effectiveness of the legal system through its
influence on the information presented to tribunals.
Louis K1ow Steven Shavell
Harvard L.aw School Harvard LawSchool
Griswold Hall-Room 402 Langdell 353
Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138
Cambridge, MA 02138This paper will consider a model of the provisionof information about
legal rules to parties when they have already committed acts towhich the
rules apply.'The provision of advice about legal rules in these
circumstances is, of course, one of the main tasks of lawyers inthe setting
of litigation.(Such advice is to be distinguished from advice that is given
before parties act, on which we shall comment in our conclusion.)
We begin in section 1 by observing that advice has no clearinfluence on
the information received by a tribunal: advice may lead to thepresentation
either of more or of less information.We also note that advice can only
reduce the sanction imposed on a person; it thus tends to reduceexpected
sanctions.
We then consider how the prospect of being able to obtain legaladvice if
a person comes before a tribunal will affecthis choice among possible acts.
Because the future availability of legal advice reduces expectedsanctions,
advice tends to encourage the commission of acts subject to sanctions.
Indeed, this consequence of advice led Bentham (1827) to argue that legal
advice is socially undesirable.We find, however, that advice may be socially
irrelevant or desirable, as well as undesirable.An important reason for our
conclusion is that the level of sanctions can be raised to offset thediluting
effect of legal advice.Our analysis is illustrated with an example in
section 2.
In the course of our analysis, we make two additional observationsbearing
on the social value of legal advice.First, even if advice does result in a
1While we will speak of the rules as "legal" and of providers of information
as lawyers, the analysis here will apply with respect toprovision of
information from any source to those who have acted about any rules
determining payoffs as a function of their acts.tribunal receiving more (or less) information, this need not be socially
beneficial (or detrimental) because it does not clearly enhance the tribunals
ability to induce parties to behave better.Second, legal advice provided
after parties act should not be thought, a priori, to channel behavior in
accordance with legal rules; only advice provided before parties decide how to
act should have this general tendency.2
Our conclusion in section 3 comments on differences between the legal
advice we study and legal advice offered before parties act, why it often is
rational for individuals to obtain legal advice after they act rather than
beforehand, and several other issues.
1.The Model
Individuals,who may differ from one another, choose among acts.The act
chosen by an individual will determine an evidence set.The individual will
then come before a tribunal and select from the evidence set an evidence
vector to present to the tribunal.This evidence vector, together with a
sanctioning function, will determine the sanction the individual bears.The
sanctioning function, which is to be interpreted as encapsulating legal
rules,3 is assumed to be known perfectly by lawyers, but not by individuals:
individuals have a probability distribution over possible sanctioning
functions.4We will consider two regimes, one in which the individual expects
to receive legal advice when before a tribunal (such advice is assumed to be
costless) and one in which the individual does not expect to receive advice.
2It will be clear that the social welfare problem examined in this paper
differs from the general incentive problem for which the "revelation
principle" applies.See section 1C2, note 15, and remark (d) in section 3.
The sanctioning function embodies not only rules of liability, but also
rules of legal procedure (concerning, for example, the admissibility of
evidence and burdens of proof).
The framework of evidence sets and the choice of evidence vectors to submit
to a tribunal is introduced in Shavell (1989) (which, however, assumes that
parties have perfect knowledge of the sanctioning function, rendering legal
advice irrelevant).
-2-A.The Selection of Evidence
We consider first an individual's choice of what evidence to present.It
should be noted that the subject of legal advice about actsalready committed
can be of interest only where parties possess evidencethat they can elect
whether to reveal to tribunals.If parties do not possess such private
knowledge (if tribunals are able to "observe" all that is relevant), then
tribunals merely will apply legal rules using observables, and any advice
given to parties about the rules will be irrelevant.
Define the following notation.
e —anevidence vector that an individual might provide to the
tribunal;
=theevidence set available to an individual; the set is comprised
of different evidence vectors;
—apossible sanctioning function, i —1 in;s1 is a
function from evidence vectors to the real numbers (sanctions);5
an individual's subjective probability that s,is the
sanctioning function.6
Each component e of an evidence vector e —(e1, ., e)will represent some
type of information (for example, an individual's whereabouts).If a
component is written as 0,theinterpretation will be that the individual is
silent about the value of the component.
An evidence set typically will contain evidence vectors that differ inthe
components about which an individual is silent.Suppose, for instance, that a
criminal defendant is deciding whether or not to establish his whereabouts and
to provide the name of an accomplice.Then (abstracting from other types of
evidence) the evidence set would consist of four vectors: complete
silence; (,name), silence only about whereabouts; (whereabouts,), silence
only about the accomplice; (whereabouts,name), complete information.Note
that if the defendant is unable to establish his whereabouts, the evidence set
It will not matter whether or not the true sanctioning function actually is
one of the s.
6Theqjands may vary among individuals.
-3-would consist of only two vectors: and(,name).alternatively, if the
defendant is unable to conceal the accomplice's name, the evidence set would
consist of (,name) and (whereabouts,name).Thus, our framework implicitly
allows for the tribunal to observe certain information independently of what
the defendant reveals.
For simplicity, we assume that an individual's utility is some function of
his act, minus the sanction (see section B) ,sothat he dislikes sanctiona and
cares only about their expected value.
If an individual has the advice of a lawyer --whoknows the sanctiening
function --theindividual will be able to present to the tribunal the (an)
evidence vector from the evidence set that minimizes the sanction.(For
convenience, we assume throughout that a ninimum exists.)Hence, if the
sanctioning function turns out to be s, the sanction the individual will bear





If an individual does not have the advice of a lawyer, the individual must
choose an evidence vector based on his imperfect informatien about the




Hence, the expected sanction will be at least as high if an individual dees
not have legal advice and will be strictly higher unless there exists e e
that minimizes s for all i for which q >0.That is, if there is a positive
probability that the lawyer would strictly prefer to choose a different
evidence vector from the vector the individual would choose, legal advice has
positive value.
The tribunal nay not know whether the party before it is able to offer
evidence of any particular type.See note 15.
-4-An example will illustrate the foregoing.Suppose that the evidence set
is — (A,),(,B), (A,Bfl, and that a person thinks there are two
possible sanctioning functions, s and s, where
—10 5((,)) 10
s((A,)) 2 s2((A,)) —8
s((,B)) —8 s2((,B)) —3
s((A,B)) 6 s2((A,B)) —6
and q1 —.9and q2 —.1.If the person receives legal advice indicating that
s is the true sanctioning function, he will provide theevidence vector (A,)
he will reveal A and keep silent about B -.andbear a Sanction of 2;if
advised that 5 is the true function, he will provide (,B) and bear a
sanction of 3.The person's expected sanction if he will receive advice is
thus .9x2 + .lx3 =2.1.By contrast, if the person does not receive legal
advice, he will provide (A,) and bear an expected sanction of .9x2 +.lx8 =
2.6.The expected value of advice is.5: advice will make a difference when
s2 is the sanctioning function, which is expected to be truewith probability
.1;in that event, it will be preferable to reveal B rather than A, which will
reduce the Sanction by 8 3.
From this example, it can also be seen that there is no necessary
relationship between the information the tribunal will obtain when individuals
receive legal advice and when they do not.In the example, if s is the true
sanctioning function, the tribunal will receive the same information (namely,
A) whether or not the person has a lawyer; and if a is the true sanctioning
function, the tribunal will receive different information (B rather than A) if
the person has a lawyer.The example can easily be modified so that the
person would supply at least as much information to the tribunal without a
lawyer as with a lawyer8 or so that the person would supply at least as much
information with a lawyer as without a lawyer.9
Suppose si((A,B)) —1.Then, without a lawyer, (A,B) would minimize the
expected sanction (which would be 1.5). With a lawyer, while (A,B) would be
supplied if a1 were the sanctioning function, only (,B) would be supplied if
S were the function.
If i((')) =1,then, without a lawyer, wouldminimize the expected
sanction (which would be 1.9).But, with a lawyer, while wouldbe
presented if 5; were the sanctioning function, (#,B) would be supplied if
were the function.
-5-More general, given any evidence set Candany two evidence vectors e
and & in C'thereexist beliefs about sanctioning functions and a true
sanctioning function such that e will be supplied without a lawyer and ê will
be supplied with a lawyer.(For example, let an individual assign high
probability to a sanctioning function s1, where s1(e) =0and s1 is very large
otherwise, and let the true sanctioning function be minimized at
We may summarize as follows: (1) Without legal advice, an individual may
mistakenly reveal unfavorable information or fail to reveal favorable
information. (2) An individual will place positive value on legal advice
unless he expects that legal advice would never alter the evidence he would
present to a tribunal. (3) An individual may reveal to a tribunal more
information or less information, or more of some types of information and less
of other types, when he has legal advice than when he does not.(This follows
because, for any two evidence vectors, it is possible that one will be
revealed with legal advice and the other without legal advice.)
B.The Choice of an Act
Knowing how an individual will choose evidence to present to a tribunal
and thus his expected sanction given an. evidence set, we can calculate the
expected utility associated with possible acts and thus can determine
behavior.Define
a =anact, in the set of possible acts;
=theevidence set that will be available to an individual
who chooses act
u(a) =utilityfrom committing act a.
The expected sanction if a is chosen is derived as explained in the previous
section, with ea replacing e.Ofcourse, the expected sanction depends on
whether legal advice will be available (as described tn (1) and (2)),
10Although we assume that the choice of an act determines the evidence set
with certainty, it would be easy to consider the case where an act determines
only a probability distribution over evidence sets that will be available to a
person when coming before a tribunal.This case corresponds to the situation
in which there is only a probability that an individual will be able to
establish some fact (such as an alibi); see Shavell (1989) on this case.
-6-something that individuals are presumed to know.The expected utility
associated with choosing act a is u(a) minus theexpected sanction.
Let us now make two observations.First, we know that the expected
sanction associated with an act will be atleast as low if legal advice will
be available than if not, and will be strictly lowerif there is a positive
probability that advice will influence the evidence vectorpresented (point 2
in section A).In other words, the prospect of obtaining legaladvice will
tend to encourage acts subject to sanctionsabout which there is uncertainty
as to sanctions.
Second, although with advice individuals will beinformed of the true
sanctioning function, they will not be led to act inaccordance with the true
sanctioning function (that is, to maximize utility minusthe true sanction)
for the simple reason that advice is provided afterindividuals choose acts.
Hence our remark in the introduction that advicewill not serve well to
channel behavior among acts subject to sanctions.The only way that legal
advice received after individuals select acts can affecttheir prior choices
among acts is by reducing expectedsanctions more for some acts than for
others.(If, without advice, act a1 is preferred to act a2,then, with
advice, a2 will be preferred to a1 if and only if thereduction in the
expected sanction for a2 is sufficiently larger thanthat for a1.)
To summarize: (1) The prospect of obtaining legaladvice will tend to
encourage acts subject to sanctions aboutwhich there is uncertainty as to
sanctions (and for which there is a positive probabilitythat advice will
alter the evidence presented to a tribunal). (2)Individuals with advice will
not be led to act in accordance with the truesanctioning function, because
they choose acts before they obtain advice.Only the reduction in expected
sanctions due to advice will affect the choice among acts.
C.The Social Desirability of Legal Advice
Suppose that social welfare is measured by the sum of theutilities
individuals obtain from their acts, less the harm done by theiracts. (We
assume for simplicity that sanctions arecostless to apply and, recall, that
-7-legal advice is costless to provide.)We will now ask whether legal advice
promotes social welfare, considering first the case of a given (true)
-
sanctioningfunction s and then that of an optimally chosen sanctioning
function.We assume that the choice of a sanctioning function s may influence
an individual's probabilities over possible sanctioning functions and these
functions themselves.Thus, in generalqjqj(s) and s1() —s(;)11
1.When the sanctioning function is given.It is obvious that, given a
sanctioning function, and thus given the q1 and Sj, the availability of legal
advice may, and generally will, affect social welfare.Suppose, for ;3mple,
that without legal advice individuals are barely deterred from committinga
socially undesirable act (an act for which the harm done exceeds the utility
enjoyed).In this case legal advice will lower social welfare since, by
reducing expected sanctions, advice will create a problem of fnadequate
deterrence.For analogous reasons, legal advice may raise social welfare if,
without advice, individuals are deterred from committing a socially desirable
act.
It is also apparent that, given a sanctioning function, the effect of
legal advice on the information obtained by a tribunal is not related ina
clear way to social welfare.For instance, suppose that, without advice, the
tribunal will obtain complete information --becauseindividuals mistakenly
think that silence about anything will be very ilkely to resuft ina high
sanction --whereaswith advice the tribunal will obtain no information --
becausein fact the sanction will be mintmized if indivtduals are silent.
Suppose in addition that the availability of advice will be socially
desirable, because without advice a socially desirable act will be
discouraged.Then the availability of legal advice will be socially
beneficial even though it will result in suppression of information to the
tribunal.It is also easy to construct examples in which the availability of
advice will be socially undesirable even though it will result in greater
information teaching the tribunal.'2
-
Two polar cases are that an individual's beliefs are correct (q-=Iwhere
s is the true sanctioning function) and that his beliefs are fixed (the q1
and s are independent of s).
-8-2.When the sanctioning function is chosenoptimally.Now consider the
effect of the availability of legal advice onsocial welfare when the
sanctioning function s may be varied, thusaffecting the qjands.In
particular, it is of interest to consider the optimalsanctioning function for
regimes with and without advice and to determinewhether social welfare is
higher in one regime than in the other.We assume that the social authority
knows the probability distribution of individuals' types,where an
individual's type is comprised of his set of possibleactions a, the evidence
set rassociatedwith each action, and his beliefs about the lawembodied in
q(s) and s1(;s).The social authority chooses s (which can be afunction
only of the evidence vector e revealed) and whetherlegal advice is to be
available.For any s and a decision about the presence orabsence of legal
advice, the social authority can determine theaction of each type of
individual and thus compute social welfare.(In what follows, however, we
will need to say very little about what characterizesthe optimal s.In
particular, although the optimal s will reflect the inferences atribunal
should make and the effect of sanctions on the incentive toreveal
information, it will not be necessary to characterize these aspectsof the
sanctioning function to establish our results.'3)
When the sanctioning function is chosen optimally, theavailability of
legal advice may matter less to social welfare than onemight think because
(as was suggested in the introduction) it may bepossible to compensate for
the reduction in expected sanctions due to legal adviceby increasing the
level of sanctions.Indeed, for this reason legal advice may have noeffect
on social welfare.A sufficient condition for that to be the caseobviously
is that if sis the optimal sanctioning function without (with)legal advice,
there exists a sanctioning functionsuch that, for all individuals, the
expected sanction underwith (without) advice is the same as under s without
12Suppose that without advice individuals reveal no informationbecause they
mistakenly think that this will be likely to result in theleast sanction,
whereas with advice they will reveal information.Suppose also that advice
will be socially undesirable because without advice a sociallyundesirable act
will be barely deterred.
13Seealso note 15.
-9-(with) advice.This condition clearly implies that individuals can be induced
to behave in the same, optimal way when legal advice is available as when it
is not.In the next section, an example will be provided that satisfies this
condition.
The condition will not hold if individuals' beliefs are not sufficiently
responsive to changes in actual sanctions.In the simple case of fixed
beliefs, changing actual sanctions has no influence on beliefs, so that the
consequences of legal advice for social welfare will be as described in
subsection 1, where sanctions were taken as given.In this case, legal advice
may be desirable or undesirable.
Moreover, even if individuals' beliefs are responsive to changes in actua]
sanctions, the sufficient condition generally will not hold if individuals
beliefs differ.There will not exist a sanctioning function that will, for
allindividuals,produce the same behavior when legal advice is available as
is produced under s when advice is unavailable.Hence, in general, the
presence or absence of legal advice will matter to social welfare.
A particular reason (which we believe to be important in fact) why the
availability of legal advice may matter to social welfare is that the need to
control the behavior of individuals who know the relevant legal rules places
constraints of sorts on the sanctioning function.Suppose, to illustrate,
that the fraction in the population of such informed individuals (for whom,
note, legal advice has no effect) is large, and let s* be the optimal
sanctioning function for controlling them.Then the optimal sanctioning
function for controlling the entire population --includingthe small minority
of uninformed individuals --willtend to be close to 5*Hence, the
situation with regard to the uninformed individuals will be like that
described in subsection 1, with the sanctioning function in effect fixed at
s, in which case the availability of legal advice will matter.14
14The point discussed in this paragraph can, on reflection, be seen to
involve the type of failure of the sufficient condition noted in the preceding
paragraph:Given any s applying when advice is unavailable, the same s must
be employed to induce the informed group to behave identically when advice is
available, but a different sanctioning function must be employed to induce the
-10 -Finally, it ahould be stated that, for essentially the reasons discussed
when the sanctioning function was taken as given, there ia no clear connection
between the information supplied to the tribunal as a consequence of legal
advice and social welfare.This is illustrated in the example in section 2,
in which the optimum can be achieved when, as a consequence of legal advice,
no information is supplied to the tribunal, partial information issupplied,
or complete information is supplied.That the revelation of information due
to legal advice does not necessarily affect social welfare, and that the
optimum does not generally involve revelation of all information which
individuals possess, should not be surprising.15After all, legal advice
alters the information individuals reveal only when individuals' beliefs about
s were such that they would have made mistakes about what evidence to present.
As a result, if legal advice causes more or less evidence to be revealed, this
has no obvious effect on the extent to which individuals will choose acts in
accordance with the true sanctioning function and thus no obvious effect on
social welfare16
In suinniary, our conclusions with respect to social welfare are:(1) The
availability of legal advice may be socially desirable or detrimental when the
sanctioning function is taken as given, since the reduction in expected
sanctions due to advice may beneficially or disadvantageously affect behavior.
uninformed to behave identically (if, indeed, such a sanctioning function
exists).
While in our example in section 2 an optimum can be achieved without full
revelation of information, it can also be achieved with full revelation.But
in general full revelation will not characterize the optimum.An important
reason --independentof individuals' uncertainty concerning the true
sanctioning function --isthat the tribunal, will not necessarily know what
evidence set is available to an individual.Therefore, high sanctions for
failure to reveal some type of information would sometimes result in such
sanctions being imposed on those unable to reveal the information.This would
generally be suboptimal, as explored in Shavell (1989).Moreover, the ability
to induce revelation at trial in the context we examine has no direct
connection to the efficiency of ex ante behavior, which determines social.
welfare.See remark (d) in section 3.
16Statedalternatively, social welfare is determined solely by individuals'
decisions about how to act, decisions that are made based on their beliefs
about s.To the extent that individuals do not know s,they do not know how
their sanction will be affected by the information they reveal.Of course,
revelation often will be relevant in determining the optimal s,as individuals
beliefs typically have some relationship to the true s, but the effect of
legaladvice on information presented has no direct bearing on achievable
social welfare.
-11-(2) While it is possible that the availability of legal advice will have no
effect on behavior when the sanctioning function is chosen optimally (because
the reduction in expected sanctions due to legal advice can be offset
perfectly by a change in sanctions), this will not generally be so.(3)
Whether tribunals receive more or less information as a result of legal advice
has no clear effect on behavior and thus no necessary relationship to social
welfare.
2.An Example
Acts: a0 a1 a2
Utility: 0 u1 u2 u1,u2 C [O,u']
Harm: 0 h1 h2 0<h1<h2<u'
Evtdence sets: (a0) (,a1) (,a2)
That is, an individual may do nothing, a0,in which case he obtains no
utility, produces no harm, and is in effect observed by the tribunal to have
done nothing (the only evidence vector indicates that he engaged in act a0).
Or an individual may select a1 or a2, with utilities u1 and u2 that, while
known to him when he chooses, are drawn for each act and for each individual
independently from the same distribution, described by a positive density
function over [O,u'J.Which of a1 and a2 an individual chooses will not be
known to the tribunal unless the individual reveals it.
Li an individual chooses a0,the tribunal will be assumed to impose no
sanction,17 and individuals will be presumed to know this.If an individual
chooses a1 or a2 and reveals his choice, the sanction will be oi for a1 and °2
for a2; and if the individual does not reveal his act, the sanction will be
a.It will be supposed that individuals know a but not the sanctions for a1
and a2: for each, they think that the sanction will be °1 with probability .5
and 02 with probability518
In the cases we consider, it can be shown (and will be obvious) that
imposing no sanction for a0 is an optimum.
That is, individuals believe one of two sanctioning functions is correct,
s or 2' where i() —a,s1(a1) —°is1(a2) —°2;2() —a,s2(a1) —
-12 -Before going further, let us consider the first-best and second-best
solutions to this example.Clearly, the first-best solution is for an
individual to choose the a (i —1,2)for which u -h1is higher, provided
this higher quantity is non-negative; otherwise, he should choose a0.The
second-best solution is for an individual to choose a1 or a2, whichever he
prefers, if and only if the higher uj exceeds h —.5(h,+h2).'9
Now consider the situation assuming that °<< 2.Anindividua] who
will not have legal advice and who commits acts a1 or a2 will bear an expected
sanction 5 5(a +o)if he reveals his act and o if he does not.Hence,
an individual who commits a1 or a2 will reveal his act if and only if a >,
andhis expected sanction will be
(3)min(o,&).
Therefore, an individual will commit a1 or a2, whichever has higher utility,
if this utility exceeds (3); otherwise, he will commit a0.If an individual
will have legal advice, he will reveal his act if and only if the sanction for
it is lower than a.The expected sanction for acts a1 and a2 will be
(4).5o +
whichis less than (3).With legal advice, therefore, an individual's choice
is made in the same way as without advice, except that the higher utility need
only exceed (4)to lead him to commit a1 or a2 rather than a0.Thus, more
individuals will commit a1 and a2 if legal advice is available than if not.
s2(a2) o; and q1 =q2=.5.Note here that the q1 do not depend on the true
sanctioning function but the s do.
More precisely, the second-best problem in which we shall be interested is
maximization of social welfare, where the social authority gives individua.s a
rule to follow in choosing how to act, but the rule cannot state directly that
act a1 or a2 be chosen; rather, the rule can state only that a0 or the act
with the smaller or with the larger utility be chosen.Formally, the social
authority can employ a rule f(u1,u2) determining an individual's act, where
the range of f is (a0,a,i), where a is the act a1 or a2 for which the utility
is smaller and is the other act (if u1=u2, let a be either of the acts with
probability .5).
The solution is as claimed since, when an individual commits an act other
than a0,it is equally likely that the act wifl. be a1 as that it will be a2.
(Given that u1 and u2 are drawn independently from the same distribution, it
is equally likely that a, and a2 wifl. be chosen.)Thus, the expected harm
will be h.
-13 -(This ilLustrates point 1 in B.)However, the availability of legal advice
wilUnot influence an individual's choice between a1 and a2:if an individual
commits one of these two acts, he will commit whichever act yields the higher
utility regardless of the availability of advice.(This illustrates point 2
in B.)
Consider how advice affects the information individuals reveal.Without
advice individuals may fail to reveal a favorable fact (the case where they
keep silent, because a# C 5, and commit the act a1 with an actual sanction of
a1) or may reveal an unfavorable fact (the case where they commit the act a2
with an actual sanction of a2 and reveal it because a > &).Withadvice,
individuals avoid making both of these errors.(This illustrates points 1 and
2 in A:)
Next, examine how advice affects social welfare.Given the sanctioning
function, the availability of legal advice could be socially desirable or
undesirable.If, in the absence of advice,(3) is less than or equal to H--
thatis,too many individuals commit the acts a1 and a2 --thenadvice will be
undesirable since it will lead even more individuals to commit these acts.
If, however,(3) and (4) both exceed h, then advice may be socially desirable
since it will result in a desirable increase in the number of individuals
committing these acts.(This illustrates point 1 in C.)
If the sanctioning function is optimally chosen, the second-best optimum
can be achieved, and, in particular, it can be achieved whether or not legal
advice is available; thus the availability of advice will not affect social
welfare.Specifically, in the absence of advice, let a =H,andchoose
a1 C a C a2 such that a C .Thenindividuals who choose a1 or a2 will keep
silent and face an expected sanction of a =h,so the second-best optimum
will be achieved.Or choose a1 C a, C a2 such that =hC a#.Then
individuals who choose a1 or a2 will reveal their acts and again face an
expected sanction of H.Ifadvice will be available, choose a1 C a C a2 such
that .5a1 + .5a# —H,sothat individuals who choose a1 or a2 will reveal their
acts if and only if the actual sanction is a1 (which will be the case when
they have chosen a1, although individuals will not know this at the time they
-14-choose); they will face an expected sanction of h.2°(This illustrates the
first part of point 2in C.)
Note that the second-best level of social welfare is achievable with quite
different information reaching the tribunal: everything revealed to the
tribunal (the case in the absence of advice if< o4; nothing revealed to
the tribunal (the case in the absence of advice if < 5); and only the
favorable information revealed to the tribunal (the case if advice is
available).(This illustrates point 3 in C.)
Next consider the situation assuming that c < o <.21Herean
individual without legal advice will reveal whichever act he commits, so the
expected sanction if he commits a1 or a2 will be &.Moreover,since he
believes a lawyer would always advise that he reveal his act, legal advice
will have no value to him --andobviously will not affect behavior or social
welfare.Also, the second-best optimum can be achieved by choosing a1 and a2
such that 5R.
Inthis example, it is thus possible to alter sanctions to offset
perfectly the effect of legal advice (in cases where it has any effect) Had
we introduced either limitations on the responsiveness of individuals to
changes in the true sanctioning function or other types of individuals who
responded differently to changes in sanctions, legal advice would affect
achievable welfare, as indicated in section C.
20Observethat sanctions that are optimal in the absence of advice will be
too low when advice is available.For example, suppose that, in the absence
of advice, a1 =h1,a2h2, and c h1 +(2/3)(h2 -h1).Thus =h<c,and
the second-best optimum will be achieved.However, sinceSc1 +.5c=
h1+(l/3)(h2 -h1)< h,a1 or a must be raised when legal advice is
available.
21Itwill not be necessary, and would be tedious, to consider other cases
(such as a2 =a>a1).
-15 -3.concluding Remarks
(a) We have seen that while legal advice obtained after acts have been
committed generally has positive private value, it is unclear whether it has
positive social value.One result of this possible divergence between private
and social values is that in some areas of litigation lawyers may be in high
demand even though their services are socially counterproductive.22(But how
to identify such areas and what policies to employ with respect to them are
difficult questions.)
(b) Whereas advice about legal rules does not tend to be socially valuable
when provided after acts have been committed, advice does tend to be socially
valuable when it is provided ex ante.In that case, if individuals know what
legal rules will apply and the rules are properly enforced, their behavior
will be affected by these rules rather than by their subjective beliefs about
the rules.23(However, a complicating factor is that ex ante legal advice
will affect individuals' ability to select evidence when before a tribunal,
raising the issues associated with ex post advice.)
(c) It is of interest to ask why individuals do not always obtain complete
legal advice ex ante.After all, legal advice obtained ex ante is more
valuable to individuals than advice obtained after they act, because ex ante
advice allows them to choose their acts in accordance with true expected
sanctions as well as to select what evidence to present when they come before
a tribunal.Ex post advice enables individuals to do only the latter.An
important reason why individuals may forgo ex ante advice is that the expected
cost of ex post advice may be lower because it often is needed only with a
probability.This is true because many acts are sanctionable only if they
produce harm and because, even if an act is sanctionable, it may not be
detected or result in a suit.Moreover, even if the likelihood is substantial
that individuals will come before tribunals and it therefore is rational for
22It is also possible that the social value of legal advice would exceed its
private value.
23See Shavell (1988).
-16 -them to obtain ex ante advice about the level of expected sanctions, it may
also be rational for them to defer answering most questions about the actual
conduct of litigation: ex ante, there will be a range of situations that a
person may later confront, and only one ultimately willbe realized.It
therefore is not surprising that a substantial portion of all legal advice is
provided after acts have been committed.
(d) The value to a tribunal of information about individual behavior in
the context studied in this paper should be contrasted with the value of
information about behavior in the usual context studied by economists --in
which those affected by rules know the rules ex ante.In that context,
information about individual behavior generally is socially valuable.With
more information, the tribunal has greater opportunity toaffect behavior.If
a variable describing acts can be observed and thusused in a rule to affect
punishments or rewards, and individuals know this rule (and that the variable
will be observed) ex ante, their choice of acts will be affected: they will
have an incentive to select acts that result in levels of the variable that
lower their punishment or raise their reward.
As emphasized here, the situation is different when individuals are
uncertain about rules ex ante and only learn about rules ex post.In this
case, information about the variable made available as aresult of legal
advice does not allow the tribunal to influence ex ante behavior in any
obviously beneficial way.This is because individuals will not know what
information will become available to the tribunal as a result of legal advice
and what sanctions will follow as a function of the information that is made
available.Thus, there is no clear value to the tribunal in being able to
observe the variable as a result of legal advice.
(e) In an elaborated informal treatment of the subject of this paper
(Kaplow and Shavell, 1988), we consider a variety of issues that were omitted
here.One issue concerns the availability of legal advice to plaintiffs (as
opposed to defendants).This increases plaintiffs' expected recoveries, which
amounts to increasing defendants' expected sanctions.Thus, making advice
available to both types of parties will have opposing effects that might, but
-17 -need not, offset each other.Another issue involves the use of nortmonetary,
socially costly sanctions (such as imprisonment).In this case, the sanctions
actually imposed -- notjust the effect of expected sanctions on ex ante
behavior --arerelevant to social welfare.
-18 -References
Bentham,Jeremy. The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Book 5.1827.
Kaplow, Louis and Shavell, Steven. "Legal Advice about Information to
Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability." Harvard Law Rev.
102 (January 1989) :565-615.
Shavell, Steven.Leal Advice about Contemplated Acts: The Decision to
Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, IT
LegalStudies 17 (January 1988): 123-150.
______OptimalSanctions and the Incentive to Provide Evidence to Lega'.
Tribunals." Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. (forthcoming .989).
-19 -